Abstract. We focus on the incentives of an industry with a continuum of small …rms to invest in a cleaner technology under two environmental policy instruments: tradable emission permits and emission taxation. We assume asymmetric information, in that the …rms' abatement costs with the new technology are either high or low. Environmental policy is set either before the …rms invest (commitment) or after (time consistency).
…rm-level) informational asymmetry about …xed adoption costs. This is close to several real-life policy problems where entire sectors are subject to regulation and are expected to implement the same clean technology (e.g. renewable energy).
The comparison of incentives towards cleaner technology adoption has been the subject of a substantial amount of literature, starting from the seminal papers by Downing and White (1986) and Milliman and Prince (1989) . 2 This literature had the merit to bring to scholars'attention the need to explicitly include technological change in instruments comparisons. Unold (2001, 2003) build and comment upon earlier papers on the relative merits of di¤erent environmental policy instruments in terms of technology adoption. Through the lens of general models featuring heterogeneous (Requate and Unold, 2001 ) and homogeneous (Requate and Unold, 2003) …rms, the authors compare emission taxes or abatement subsidies and tradable emission permits endogenizing the number of adopters of the new technology. They focus on two extreme cases: one in which the regulator sets the policy that was optimal without the new technology, and another, which is the most relevant for our purposes, where the regulator knows about the new technology. In the latter case, with commitment as well as with time consistency, the regulator can implement the social optimum.
Even with perfect information, commitment and time consistency do not usually implement the …rst best if there are additional market failures (other than pollution). If the number of …rms is small, they can a¤ect environmental policy under time consistency, which typically precludes attainment of the …rst best. However, this does not mean that commitment leads to higher welfare than time consistency. Amacher and Malik (2002) demonstrate these …ndings for emission taxation of a single …rm choosing whether or not to adopt a new abatement technology, so that technology adoption is a discrete variable.
Our model is more speci…c than Requate and Unold's settings in order to keep it manageable with the added complexity of asymmetric information. In our setting, …rms in the industry are symmetric in terms of abatement costs, as in Requate and Unold (2003) , but asymmetric in terms of …xed adoption costs. We will see that with asymmetric information, the regulator can implement the …rst best under time consistency, but not under commitment. More speci…cally, we show that under commitment both instruments can lead to over-or underinvestment ex post, depending on the realization of the cost parameter. Asymmetric information, coupled with the assumption that the regulator sets the policy taking into account the knowledge she has of the distribution of cost parameters, implies therefore that the clear cut link between taxes (permits) and over (under) investment obtained in Unold (2001, 2003) does not hold. However, underinvestment with permits is con…rmed in expected terms. Finally, again like Unold (2001, 2003) we …nd that the regulator can implement the welfare optimum under time consistency. This is because the regulator can perfectly infer the cost realization of the new technology. Weitzman (1974) was the …rst to systematically address the relative performance of price and quantity regulation under uncertainty in environmental policy or indeed any area of policy. Whereas Weitzman (1974) concentrates mainly on uncertainty about the intercept of the industry's Aggregate Marginal Abatement Cost (AMAC) curve, we consider uncertainty about its slope.
As in Weitzman (1974) , we …nd that the comparison of price and quantity instruments depends on the (average) slopes of the AMAC and Marginal Environmental Damage curves. However, in our paper the average slope of the AMAC curve is determined by a counterintuitive rule of reverse probability weighting: the steep slope is weighted by the probability that the slope is ‡at and vice versa.
Recent papers in the Weitzman (1974) vein include Mandell (2008) , who considers regulating part of the polluters by tradable permits and the other part by emission taxation. Krysiak and Oberauner (2011) let the …rms choose between the two instruments. Stranlund (2014) compares an emission tax to a hybrid tradable permit scheme with a price ‡oor and a price ceiling (as introduced by Roberts and Spence, 1976 ) when uncertainty about abatement costs and environmental damage is correlated (as analyzed by Stavins, 1996) and …nds that when the correlation is negative, taxes can still be preferable to the hybrid instrument. Ambec and Coria (2013) compare price and quantity instruments for the control of two pollutants with asymmetric information about their interdependent abatement costs. Yates (2012) deviates from the usual comparison of constant permit sup-ply with a constant tax rate, showing that the optimal permit supply function is better at dealing with abatement cost uncertainty than the optimal pollution tax function.
Combining asymmetric information and innovation, Mendelsohn (1984) , Krysiak (2008) and Storrøsten (2014) examine how endogenous technical change a¤ects the choice between price and quantity instruments under commitment. In all three papers, technology choice is continuous: A …rm can invest to reduce the intercept and (in Krysiak (2008) and Storrøsten (2014) ) the slope of its MAC curve. Mendelsohn (1984) considers a single …rm, with asymmetric information about marginal abatement costs and investment costs. Krysiak (2008) considers an industry with many ex-ante identical small …rms who discover their marginal abatement costs after they have made their investment decision.
Storrøsten (2014) adds product demand uncertainty to Krysiak's (2008) model. All three papers …nd (as we do in our model) that endogenous technical change reduces the slope of the long-run MAC curve, making quantity regulation more attractive.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We set out the model in Section 2. In Section 3 we derive the social optimum (or …rst best) for the full-information benchmark.
Section 4 discusses how the …rms make their emission and technology adoption decisions.
In Section 5 (6) we analyze the regulator's behaviour and we derive the subgame perfect equilibria under commitment (time consistency). In both Sections we …rst determine the full-information equilibrium as a benchmark, con…rming Requate and Unold's (2001) …nding that this implements the …rst best. Section 7 concludes.
The model
There is a continuum of …rms with mass 1, currently using abatement technology 1. A …rm's total and marginal abatement costs with the current technology are:
with e 1 the emission level. Note that with the current technology, there are no …xed costs and all …rms have the same cost function. Note also that, as is standard, the cost function is decreasing and convex in emissions.
The …rms must choose whether or not to invest in a cleaner technology. Firm i's variable abatement cost with the new technology is:
with e the emission level. Two sources of asymmetric information are present in our model: on variable costs and on …xed costs. First of all, asymmetric information is assumed concerning the cost parameter , which is known by the …rms but not by the regulator; the latter has an a priori distributon on according to which it takes the value L with probability v; and the value H with probability 1 v; where
Note that the cost parameter is the same for all …rms, i.e. is an aggregate asymmetric information parameter, linked to factors such as the speed at which the cost of the new technology falls over time, or di¢ culties by …rms to get the needed …nancial resources.
The assumption L > 1 2 is intended to limit our attention to the more plausible case of incremental innovation, and not of technologies that drastically reduce abatement costs.
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Adoption also implies …xed cost F i of switching from the current to the new technology. Each …rm i knows its own F i : The regulator knows that …xed cost F i is uniformly distributed between 0 and F; but she does not know the …xed cost of any individual …rm. As a result, …xed cost F i is a source of idiosyncratic (i.e. …rm-speci…c) asymmetric information.
From (2), …rm i's total and marginal abatement costs with the new technology are:
Total emissions E are:
with the share of …rms adopting the new technology. Total and marginal environmental damage is, respectively:
with d > 0:
3 For simplicity, we ignore the possibility that technological change reduces MAC for low levels of abatement, but increases it for high levels (Amir et al., 2008; Bauman et al., 2008; Brechet and Jouvet, 2008) . Perino and Requate (2012) explore the implications in a model with perfect information. 4 The consequence of dramatic technological change (i.e. < In order to rule out corner solutions where = 1 and/or e = 0; we shall assume:
Note that (6) together with L > H > 1 2 implies:
We analyze two environmental policy instruments in two policy regimes. The two environmental policy instruments are emission taxation and auctioned tradable emission permits. Until recently, tradable permit schemes were mostly based on grandfathering. Currently there is a movement toward auctioning of permits, especially in Phase 3
(2013-2020) of the EU Emissions Trading System, the largest tradable permit scheme in existence. We will assume that the tradable permits are fully auctioned. This makes for the clearest comparison with emission taxation. With both instruments, the …rms have to pay the government for all their emissions. More importantly, with either instrument the regulator can only set the value of a single variable (the tax rate or the total amount of permits). In the Conclusion, we will discuss how grandfathering of permits would a¤ect our results.
The two policy regimes we consider are commitment and time consistency, the di¤er-ence between them occurring in stages one and two of the game between the regulator and the industry. In stage zero of each game, nature draws the cost realization and each …rm i's …xed cost F i : As already mentioned, these costs are revealed to the …rms, but not to the regulator. All other parameters are common knowledge.
Under commitment, the regulator sets the total amount of emission permits or the emission tax rate in stage one. 6 In stage two, the …rms choose a technology. This order is reversed under time consistency. Finally, in stage three the …rms choose their emission level.
3 Full-information social optimum
In this section we derive the social optimum for the case where the regulator knows the realization of and each …rm i's …xed cost F i in (3). Figure 1 illustrates the outcome for d = 1:2; = 0:6; F = 0:32:
Given ; the regulator sets the share of investing …rms and emissions e (e 1 ) by …rms with the new (current) technology. It is easily seen that the regulator would like for each …rm with the same technology to emit the same amount, and for the …rms with the lowest …xed costs to invest in the new technology. Social costs are:
The …rst term on the RHS is total abatement cost for the …rms with the current technology, from (1). The second (third) term is total variable (…xed) cost for the …rms with the new technology, by (3). There are …rms investing in the new technology, with costs uniformly distributed between 0 and F; so that average cost is 1 2 F and total …xed cost is 1 2 2 F: Lastly, the fourth term is environmental damage, from (4) and (5).
Minimizing (10) with respect to e 1 and e yields:
This is the standard condition that marginal abatement costs of all …rms should be equal to each other and to marginal environmental damage. We denote the level at which M ACs are equalized by ; which may be interpreted as the shadow cost of emissions.
In Figure 1 , the curves M AC 1 and M AC show the marginal abatement costs for the current and the new technology, respectively. Interpreted as functions of e 1 and e ; they show a single …rm's M AC with the current and the new technology respectively.
Interpreted as functions of E, they show the industry's M AC if all …rms used the same technology. In Figure 1 , when M AC equals 0 ; for instance, a …rm with the new (current)
technology emits e 0 (e 0 1 ) in the social optimum according to (11). Minimizing (10) with respect to yields:
This is the equivalent of equation (7) in Requate and Unold (2001, p. 544) . It says that for the marginal …rm that adopts the new technology (the adopting …rm with the highest …xed cost F i ), its increase in abatement costs (the LHS of (12)) should equal the decrease in environmental damage that it causes (the RHS of (12)).
By (11), the …rst two terms on the LHS of (12) cancel out and: Substituting (11) and (13) into (4), aggregate emissions at are:
From (11), (13) and (14), we can de…ne the aggregate marginal abatement cost curve:
where c is the negative of the slope of the AM AC curve with:
The AM AC function gives the industry's aggregate marginal abatement costs for a given level of E ; with e 1 ; e and set optimally according to (11) and (13). AM AC is a weighted average of M AC and M AC 1 : The higher is ; the closer AM AC is to
We can now solve (11) and (15) for the optimal level of total emissions and the corresponding level of marginal damages and aggregate marginal abatement costs:
Substituting from (17) into (13) yields the optimal fraction of adopting …rms:
The …rst inequality follows from (6) and the fact that is decreasing in F:
Note that L > H since by (9) and (18):
Aggregate total abatement costs AT AC for a given level of E with e 1 ; e and set optimally according to (11) and (13) follow from integrating AM AC in (15) with respect to E and noting that aggregate …xed costs are zero for E = 1: Figure 1 shows the optimal emission levels e ; e 1 and E ; as well as the optimal level of marginal abatement costs. Given that the optimal share of …rms have switched to the new technology, the industry's marginal abatement costs (net of …xed costs) are M AC : Aggregate variable abatement costs in the optimum are then given by the area E KJ below the M AC curve. Following our discussion above for 0 ; aggregate …xed costs are KK 1 J 1 : This area is equal to J KJ 1 : Thus, aggregate total abatement costs AT AC in the social optimum, consisting of …xed plus variable abatement costs, are
Minimized social costs are:
The second equality follows from (5) and (19). The third equality follows from (17).
In Figure 1 , aggregate total abatement costs are E KJ 1 and total environmental damage is OKE ; so that total social cost in the optimum is OKJ 1 .
Firms'choices
After deriving our …rst best benchmark, we now turn to the regulated …rms' choices concerning emission levels (subsection 4.1) and technology adoption (subsection 4.2) under emission taxes and tradable permits. The …rms know the cost realization and take environmental policy as well as the share of adopting …rms ( ) as given. Let x denote the tax rate t under emission taxation and the permit price p under tradable permits.
Emissions
In stage 3 of the commitment as well as of the time consistency regime, each …rm chooses its emission level, having already made its technology choice. A …rm minimizes the sum of tax payment (under emission taxation) or permit purchases (under auctioned permits) and variable abatement costs. Under emission taxation, each …rm takes the tax rate as given, because it has already been set by the regulator. Under tradable permits, each …rm takes the permit price as given, because the permit market is perfectly competitive since there is a continuum of …rms.
A …rm with the current technology minimizes C(e 1 ) + xe 1 ; so that by (1) it sets:
A …rm with the new technology minimizes V C i (e ) + xe , so that by (2) it sets:
Substituting (21) and (22) into (4), the relation between E and x for given and is:
Technology choice
Technology choice is stage 2 under commitment and stage 1 under time consistency. In both policy regimes and with both instruments, each …rm takes x (the tax rate or the permit price) as given. With commitment to emission taxation, the tax rate has been set in stage 1. With time-consistent taxation, the …rms realize that the tax rate (to be set in stage 2) depends on the adoption rate ; but each …rm considers itself too small to a¤ect : Under tradable permits, the …rms realize that the stage-3 permit price depends on ; 9 but again each …rm considers itself too small to a¤ect :
In the technology choice stage, each …rm thus compares its overall costs (including tax payment or permit purchase) with and without adoption of the new technology, taking x as given. Overall costs of each …rm without adopting are, from (1) and (21):
while …rm i's overall costs with the new technology are, from (3) and (22):
With new technology cost realization ; …rm i adopts if K i < K 1 or, by (24) and (25):
As a consequence, the proportion of …rms investing will be given by the proportion of …rms featuring F i < F : Since …xed costs are uniformly distributed between 0 and F; the share of adopting …rms is, from (21) and (26):
Note that (27) is the same as (13) with x = , and (21) and (22) imply the …rst equality of (11). Thus we can use AM AC as de…ned in (15) and AT AC from (19) for the policy scenarios as well. The reason is that …rms make the socially optimal investment decision, given x. Total emissions for a given level of x follow from setting AM AC equal to x in (15):
With tradable permits, we solve (27) and (28) simultaneously to …nd the equilibrium values of technology adoption and permit price p given E and :
Commitment
In this section, we derive the subgame perfect equilibrium for commitment. In stage one of the commitment game, the regulator sets the emission tax rate or the total amount of permits to be auctioned. In stage two, …rms make their technology choices, as analyzed in subsection 4.2. In stage three, …rms decide on their emission level and (under tradable permits) permit purchases, as analyzed in subsection 4.1.
In subsection 5.1, we …rst establish the full-information benchmark. We analyze emission taxation (tradable permits) under asymmetric information in subsection 5.2 (5.3).
Finally, we compare the instruments with each other in subsection 5.4.
Full-information benchmark
If the regulator knows the cost realization ; she can implement the full-information social optimum with tradable permits as well as with emission taxation. With tradable permits, 10 The …nal equality follows from (16).
the regulator will set the number of permits at E given by (17). Substituting this into (29) shows that the share of adopting …rms in stage two will then be the optimal amount given by (18). With emission taxation, the regulator would set the tax rate equal to given by (17). Substituting this into (27) shows that in stage two, the share of adopting …rms will be as given by (18), and substituting it into (28) shows that in stage 3 total emissions will be E given by (17).
We thus con…rm Requate and Unold's (2001) …nding that under perfect information, commitment implements the …rst best with tradable permits and emission taxation when regulating pollution and technology adoption by a continuum of heterogeneous …rms.
Asymmetric information, emission taxation
In stage 1, the regulator sets the tax rate t that minimizes expected social cost. For cost realization ; social costs are, substituting (28) into (5) and (19) with x = t:
Accounting for the probability that the …rms are e¢ cient (ine¢ cient), given by v
(1 v); we can write expected social costs using (30) as:
The …rst order condition for t requires:
withĉ de…ned as the reverse probability-weighted average of c :
Solving for the optimal tax rate yields:
Substituting (32) into (27), the share of adopting …rms under cost realization is then:
We de…ne excess social costs XSC as the social costs in excess of the minimized full-information social costs given by SC in (20) for a given : From (30) and (32):
Expected excess social costs XSC are then, under taxation:
with the variance of c given by:
Asymmetric information, Tradable Permits
Expected social costs with tradable permits are, from (5), (19) and (29):
The …rst order condition with respect to E is:
with the expected value of c given by:
Solving for E yields:
Substituting (39) into (29), we …nd the equilibrium permit price p and adoption share for cost realization :
Following the same reasoning as in the case of taxation, we substitute from (39) into (37) and subtract expected …rst best social costs obtained from (20) to calculate expected excess social costs under emissions trading and commitment:
Comparison
In this section we compare emission permits and emission taxes under commitment, both with …rst best levels and with each other, in terms of welfare and technology adoption.
Technology adoption
Let us …rst analyze ex post technology adoption, i.e. for a given realization of .
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Proposition 1 Under commitment, taxation (emissions trading) leads ex post to over(under) investment for a favourable cost realization, and to under(over) investment for an unfavourable cost realization.
Intuitively, under emission taxation, the second best tax rate must be between the ex post optimal level for = L and the ex post optimal level for = H: Then, as the share of adopting …rms is increasing in the tax rate for a given …rms'type, we can easily conclude that ex post overinvestment (underinvestment) takes place when = L (when = H): With tradable permits, it is straightforward to show from (17) and (39) that the total amount of permits must be between the ex post optimal amount for = L and the ex post optimal amount for = H: This clearly implies that the second best permits price is lower (higher) than in the social optimum when = L (when = H). Since, for a given …rms'type, the share of adopting …rms is increasing in the permit price by (27), then tradable permits lead to ex post underinvestment when = L and overinvestment when = H; the opposite of what happens under emission taxation.
Let us now turn to the ex ante expected share of adopters .
Proposition 2 Expected adoption with tradable permits under commitment is lower than under …rst best:
11 See Appendix A for the proofs of Propositions 1, 2 and 5. : De…ne E( ) as the emission level that would lead to …rst best expected adoption
andẼ as the probability-weighted average of the full-information optimal emission levels.
;Ẽ is halfway between the …rst best levels E L and E H : Thus the increase in emissions from E L toẼ for = L is the same as the decrease in emissions from E H tõ E for = H: However, this change decreases technology adoption more for = L than it increases it for = H; because …rms are more sensitive to a change in total allowed emissions when the cost of the new technology is low, since by (29):
As a result, E( ) <Ẽ: It can also be shown that E CO >Ẽ: AtẼ; the marginal social cost related to emissions increase from E L toẼ under type L; i.e. distance BJ in Figure   2 ; is smaller than the marginal social cost of reducing emissions from E H toẼ under type 12 We prove this inequality in Appendix A.2:
H; distance GB: 13 As optimality requires that the two marginal social costs be equal to each other, thenẼ is too low to be optimal and thus E CO >Ẽ: This in turn implies that E( ) < E CO ; so that, as adoption is decreasing in the aggregate cap, expected adoption under tradable permits is smaller than …rst best. The intuition is as follows. Because AM AC H is steeper than AM AC L , the regulator is more worried about emissions turning out too low in hindsight when = H than about emissions turning out too high when = L. As a result, the regulator sets allowed emissions relatively closer to E H rather than E L ; and expected adoption will be lower than in the optimum.
Turning to ex ante expected adoption under taxation, we get a less straightforward result. Expected adoption under taxation is more likely to be higher than optimal (and than expected adoption under tradable permits) when the …xed cost of adoption is high, technology improvement is relatively insigni…cant, and the damage parameter is small.
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The intuition is that all these factors make the AM AC curves, and especially the AM AC H curve, relatively steep compared to the M D curve. This means that the regulator is more worried about the welfare loss from underinvestment for = H than about overinvestment for = L: As a result, she will set a relatively higher tax rate, closer to H and further from L . This higher tax rate results in higher than optimal expected adoption. Clearly, when expected adoption exceeds …rst best, it also exceeds expected adoption under tradable permits, as the latter always falls short of …rst best expected adoption from Proposition 2.
Welfare
Comparing excess social costs between instruments yields, from (35) and (41):
13 The proof is as follows. Distance GB equals AM AC
From (5) and (15), with v = 1 2 , we …nd that GB is larger than BJ because:
The formal proof is available from the corresponding author upon request.
where c is the expected value of the slope of the AM AC curve given by (38) and V ar(c )
is the corresponding variance, given by (36). Crucially,ĉ as de…ned in (31) is the average slope of the AM AC curve, featuring reverse probability weights: the slope of the AM AC curve when = L is weighted with the probability that = H; and vice versa. This leads us to the following proposition: Equation (42) is reminiscent of Weitzman (1974) in that taxation is preferred if and only if the weighted average slope of the Marginal Abatement Cost (MAC) curve is larger than the slope of the Marginal Damage (MD) curve. However, as we have seen, the probability weighting is reversed in determining the average slopeĉ . This is a new result in the "prices vs. quantities" literature which, following Weitzman (1974) , has mainly concentrated on additive uncertainty (i.e. about the intercept of the MAC curve). In our setting, the cost parameter enters the individual …rm's marginal abatement cost function in an additive way in (3). However, when we take endogenous technology choice into account, the cost parameter alters the slope of the industry's aggregate marginal abatement cost curve by (15) and (16). There is thus multiplicative uncertainty about the AM AC curve (i.e. uncertainty about its slope). Weitzman (1974, p. 486; 1978) and Malcomson (1978) derive expressions for the comparative advantage of prices over quantities under multiplicative uncertainty. However, the role of reverse probability weighting is not apparent from these expressions nor is it discussed by the authors.
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We can explain the reverse probability weighting with the aid of Figure 3 . Suppose the regulator is practically certain that the cost realization is H: She would then issue E H permits and set the tax rate at H ; both given by (17): If, against all expectations, the cost realization is L; the welfare loss is RSN with emission permits and ZRJ with Weitzman (1974) , however the new element is that it is the slope of the AM AC curve in the unlikely scenario (that the cost realization is L in this example) that is relevant for the comparison between tradable permits and taxes. 16 In general, the slope of the AM AC curve in the less likely scenario receives the larger weight. This explains the reverse probability weighting of the AM AC slopes in (42).
Time Consistency
In this section, we derive the subgame perfect equilibrium for time consistency. In stage one of the time consistency game, …rms choose whether to invest in the new technology, as analyzed in subsection 4.2. In stage two, having observed the proportion of investing …rms, the regulator sets the emission tax rate or the total amount of permits to be auctioned. 16 If the regulator is practically certain that the cost realization is L; she would issue E L permits and set the tax rate at L , both given by (17) . If the cost realization is H; the welfare loss is BSR with tradable permits and SGK with taxation. The welfare loss is larger with permits, because AM AC H is steeper than M D:
In stage three, …rms decide on their emission level and (under tradable permits) permit purchases, as analyzed in subsection 4.1.
In subsection 6.1, we …rst establish the full-information benchmark. We analyze emission taxation (tradable permits) under asymmetric information in subsection 6.2 (6.3).
Full information benchmark
In this subsection we establish the subgame perfect equilibrium under time consistency, given that the regulator knows the cost realization : In stage two of the game, the regulator knows the proportion of …rms that have invested in the new technology in stage one, and she knows that in stage three the …rms will set their emissions according to (21) and (22). The regulator minimizes the sum of variable abatement cost and environmental damage which, from (1), (3), (21) and (22) is:
With emission taxation, substituting (23) into (43) yields:
Solving the …rst order condition for t yields:
In stage one, the share of adopting …rms as a function of x = t T C is given by (27).
Solving (27) and (45) for and t ; we …nd the full-information …rst best values of from (18) and from (17), respectively.
With auctioned permits, substituting (23) into (43) yields:
Solving the …rst order condition for E yields:
In stage one, the share of adopting …rms is given by (29). Solving (29) and (47) for and E ; we …nd the full-information …rst best values of from (18) and E from (17).
We thus con…rm Requate and Unold's (2001) …nding that under perfect information, time consistency implements the …rst best with tradable permits and emission taxation when regulating pollution and technology adoption by a continuum of heterogeneous …rms.
Now we turn to compare emission taxation and emission permits under time consistency and asymmetric information.
Asymmetric information, emission taxation
In this subsection we establish the subgame perfect equilibrium under emission taxation,
given that the regulator does not know the cost realization : In stage two of the game, the regulator knows the proportion of …rms that have invested in the new technology in stage one. Having observed ; the regulator updates her beliefs on the cost realization.
Let us denote the regulator's stage-2 probability that = L by q: The regulator also knows that in stage three the …rms will set their emissions according to (21) and (22) with x = t.
The regulator minimizes the sum of variable abatement cost and environmental damage according to her updated beliefs:
where, analogous to (46):
We wish to specify beliefs in such a way that they generate the full-information …rst best as the unique solution given : Furthermore, q should be nondecreasing in and beliefs should be consistent. The latter condition means that in any candidate equilibrium, q > 0 for = L and q < 1 for = H: A q( ) function that satis…es these conditions (for emission taxation as well as for tradable permits) is: .
Substituting (49) into (48) yields:
with t T C given by (45) and:
We see that t T C is a continuous, decreasing and piecewise linear function of : Figure   5 illustrates the outcome for d = 2; H = 0:8; L = 0:6; F = 0:32:
Moving to stage one, we know from subsection 4.2 that the share of adopting …rms as a function of x = t is given by (27) with: Solving (27) and (45) for and t T C ; we …nd that the full-information …rst best combination of ( ; ) from (18) and (17) respectively, is a solution. Indeed, as illustrated in Figure 5 , this is the unique solution because is increasing in t and t T C is continuous and decreasing in . We can therefore conclude the following:
Proposition 4 In the subgame-perfect equilibrium under time-consistent emissions taxation, and under regulator's beliefs as speci…ed in (49), the regulator correctly infers the cost realization from observing the share of adopting …rms. As a result, the full-information …rst best is the only equilibrium.
Asymmetric information, tradable emission permits
In this subsection we establish the subgame perfect equilibrium under tradable permits,
As with emission taxation, we assume that q; the regulator's stage-2 probability that = L; is given by (49): The regulator also knows that in stage three the …rms will set their emissions according to (21) and (22) with x = p . The regulator minimizes the sum of variable abatement cost and environmental damage according to her updated beliefs:
The …rst order condition is:
Substituting (49) into (52), E T C becomes:
with E T C given by (47) and:
Note that E T C is a continuous, piecewise linear and decreasing function of : Figure   6 illustrates E T C for the same parameter values as used in Figure 5 .
Moving on to stage one, we know from subsection 4.2 that the share of adopting …rms is given by (29) with:
The second inequality follows from (9). Figure 6 shows the L and H curves in ( ; E) space for speci…c parameter values. Note that the L curve is to the right of the H curve by @ =@ < 0 in (55). It is easily seen that ( ; E ) is a solution to (29) and (52) for cost realization . The following proposition shows that this is the unique solution, as Figure 6 illustrates for the speci…c parameter values.
Proposition 5 Under time consistency and tradable permits, and under regulator's beliefs as speci…ed in (49), the regulator correctly infers the cost realization from observing the share of adopting …rms. As a result, the full-information …rst best is the unique equilibrium.
Conclusion
Asymmetric information is an important reason why regulators struggle to set appropriate environmental policy. We have modelled the environmental regulation of an industry consisting of a continuum of small …rms, with asymmetric information about the (…xed and variable) cost of a new abatement technology. Under commitment (time consistency), the regulator sets environmental policy before (after) the …rms make their technology adoption decision. With commitment, the regulator cannot implement the …rst best (unlike with full information, as in Unold, 2001, 2003) . Tradable permits lead to higher welfare than emission taxation if and only if the slope of the marginal damage curve is steeper than the probability-weighted slopes of the marginal abatement cost curves. While this result is similar to the Weitzman (1974) rule, the probability weighting is such that the slope of the high-cost curve is weighted by the probability that cost is low, and vice versa. We further found that time consistency allows the regulator to infer the cost of the new technology. The outcome is thus the same as under full information. We know from Requate and Unold (2001) that the …rst best is implemented in this case.
Since time consistency leads to a better outcome than commitment, one may wonder why we need to analyze commitment in any detail. Why doesn't the regulator follow the time-consistent route of setting policy after the …rms have made their investment decisions and uncertainty has been resolved? One reason may be that policy can only be set at certain …xed intervals. A regulator may not always have the opportunity to wait until uncertainty has been resolved, especially if there are several sources of uncertainty, emerging and resolving themselves at di¤erent points in time. Moreover, a regulator may not be able to respond swiftly once uncertainty has been resolved.
Similarly, one may wonder why the regulator can only commit to a single tax rate or amount of tradable permits. If the regulator could commit to a policy menu, with the tax rate or amount of permits dependent on the …rms'adoption decisions, she would be able to implement the …rst best. For instance, the regulator could commit to the time-consistent policy. One di¢ culty with this is that, again, the regulator would need to be able to swiftly implement the policy once the relevant information is available. In addition, this kind of policy menu may be di¢ cult to design, to explain and to agree upon. Finally, the di¤erent situations (here: the adoption rate of the new technology) that determine the policy to be implemented must be de…ned on the basis of veri…able information. It is perhaps for these reasons that such policy menus are hardly observed in practice.
We therefore consider our time consistency scenario to be a stylized benchmark, as it is di¢ cult to imagine an immediate adjustment of environmental policies to adoption choices by regulated …rms. The type of asymmetric information modelled in our paper has therefore to be interpreted as one of the many possible bricks in a general comparison among environmental policy tools under commitment and time consistency, suggesting circumstances when, ceteris paribus, asymmetric information on abatement costs may shift the balance in favour of time consistency.
We have assumed that …rms are heterogeneous only in their cost of adopting the new technology. This assumption is not, in itself, expected to a¤ect our main results.
We have used quadratic functional forms for the abatement cost and damage functions in order to obtain de…nite results. This has allowed us to derive the modi…ed Weitzman rule with reverse probability weighting. This result, like the original Weitzman rule, only holds if abatement cost and environmental damage are (or can be approximated by) quadratic functions of emissions.
We anticipate that time consistency would also implement the full-information …rst best with more general functional forms. However, care must be taken to specify the regulator's beliefs such that this is the unique subgame perfect equilibrium.
The main reason why we found that time consistency implements the …rst best is our assumption that the industry consists of many small …rms. This means that an individual …rm considers itself too small to a¤ect environmental policy. Our model is therefore most applicable to the regulation of a large number of polluters, such as the EU Emission
Trading System or the now practically defunct Sulfur Allowance Trading programme in the US (Schmalensee and Stavins, 2013) . The small …rms assumption is the main driving force behind our conclusion that …rms make the socially optimal adoption decision, for a given tax rate or permits price, which in turn implies that the asymmetric information about …xed costs does not matter in equilibrium. As a result, the regulator, in facing informational asymmetries, only has to infer a single parameter concerning regulated …rms'costs. If, on the other hand, the industry contained a few large …rms, these …rms would generally not take the socially optimal adoption choice under any instrument or policy timing; for example, they would be able to a¤ect time-consistent policy, so that it would typically not implement the …rst best anymore and might even be worse than commitment (Amacher and Malik, 2002) . However, when there are large …rms in the industry, this also means that the tradable permit market is not perfectly competitive anymore. Tradable permits would not lead to equalization of marginal abatement costs across …rms, thereby introducing another di¤erence between this instrument and emission taxation. Needless to say, tradable permits might still be second best and better for welfare than emission taxation, because of the other market failures and opportunities for …rms' strategic behaviour.
We have assumed that the emission permits are auctioned to the …rms. This makes for the clearest comparison with emission taxation. With both instruments, the …rms have to pay the government for all their emissions. More importantly, with either instrument the regulator can only set the value of a single variable (the tax rate or the total amount of permits). Grandfathering instead of auctioning permits gives the regulator another variable to set: the number of grandfathered permits. If the number of grandfathered permits is …xed, i.e. it does not change with the …rm's adoption decision or with the total adoption rate, the outcome will be the same in terms of adoption rate and permit price (as in Requate and Unold, 2001) . Indeed, keeping the number of grandfathered permits …xed is the regulator's best strategy. This is immediately clear for time consistency, where auctioned permits already implement the full-information …rst best, so that any deviation can only reduce welfare.
With commitment, we have seen that auctioned tradable permits result in too little expected adoption of the new technology. Thus it might seem that the regulator could increase welfare by specifying the grandfathering rules in a way that stimulates adoption.
However, it should be borne in mind that given the total amount of permits issued, small …rms in our setting will make the socially optimal adoption decisions when the number of grandfathered permits is …xed. Varying the number of grandfathered permits will only increase aggregate abatement costs (and thereby social costs) for a given level of permits.
It does not help the regulator with the main problem that she has to set the total amount of permits before she knows (or can infer) the cost realization.
Finally, an interesting extension of this paper could be in the direction of more complex informational structures. For example, less straightforward conclusions in the time consistency case could be obtained assuming that the …rms only learn their marginal abatement cost parameter after investing in the new technology, as, for example, in Krysiak (2008) .
We leave this issue for future research.
A Appendix A: Proofs

A.1 Proposition 1
Under emission taxation, from (17) and (32):
As the share of adopting …rms is increasing in by (13) and in t by (27):
with given by (18). Thus with taxation, there is ex post over-(under-)investment when
With tradable permits, from (17) and (39):
As total emissions are decreasing in the optimal AM AC by (15) and in p by (28), these inequalities imply:
with given by (17). Then, since the share of adopting …rms is increasing in by (13) and in p by (27):
with given by (18). Thus with tradable permits, there is ex post under-(over-)investment when = L (H):
A.2 Proposition 2
We …rst compare the expected share of adopters under tradable permits to that with the optimal policy for each cost realization. From (18):
De…ne E( ) as the emission level (the same for both cost realizations) that would, under tradable permits, lead to : From (29) and (A3):
Let us now compare E( ) toẼ; de…ned as the probability-weighted average of the full-information optimal emission levels given by (17):
From (A4) and (A5):
The inequality follows from (16) and:
where E > 0 follows from applying (9) to:
To conclude the proof, we need to compareẼ to E CO : From (39) and (A5):
Putting (A6) and (A8) together, we see that E( ) < E CO : Since is decreasing in E by (29), this means that expected adoption with tradable permits is lower than :
A.3 Proposition 5
We …rst note that there is no solution where 2 ( H ; L ); because the only point of intersection between the E T C q curve in (54) and the curve in (29) (both being linear)
Moreover, there is no candidate equilibrium where beliefs are inconsistent. There is no solution where = L and q = 0; because the unique solution T C LH to (29) with = L and (47) with = H lies outside the range where q = 0:
where the second equality follows from (18) and the inequality follows from:
where by (9):
Neither is there a solution where = H and q = 1; because the solution T C HL to (29) with = H and (47) with = L lies outside the range where q = 1:
The inequality follows from:
with > 0 given by (A9).
B Appendix B: Conditions for an interior solution B.1 Positive emission levels by adopting …rms
In this section we verify that all possible scenarios feature e > 0 for any probability v of = L: From (22) this implies that the optimal M AC; the tax rate and the permit price must all be below :
B.1.1 Commitment and full-information social optimum For = L; it follows from (A1) and (A2) that:
Thus we need to make sure that t CO < L: From (A1) we know that t CO < H : As a result:
The …nal inequality follows from (7) and (16).
For = H; it follows from (A1) and (A2) that:
Thus we need to make sure that p H (E CO ) < H: From (40) this implies:
The …rst inequality follows from the fact that the LHS is increasing in v: Noting that c H > H by (6) and (16); the second inequality can be rewritten as:
Condition (7) is a su¢ cient condition for (B5) to hold, because using (16), the former can be rewritten as:
where the second inequality holds because, from (16):
The inequality follows from 1 2 < L H < 1 and (6).
B.1.2 Time consistency
Under time consistency, e > 0 should hold in any subgame where the regulator believes there is a positive probability that occurs. From (22) and (49), this means that t T C ; p For taxation and q < 1, we …nd from (50):
The …rst inequality follows from the fact that t T C is decreasing in : The second inequality follows from (8).
For taxation and q > 0; so that 2 ( H ; 1]; we …nd from (17) and (50):
The …rst inequality follows from the fact that t T C is decreasing in : The second inequality follows from (B2).
For tradable permits and q < 1; note …rst that for 
We thus have to verify that p (29) and (B4) we see that:
The …rst inequality follows from @p H =@ < 0 by (23) and (17), (29) and (55). The second inequality follows from (B4).
For tradable permits and q > 0; note …rst that for 2 [ L ; 1] where q = 1; we have (23), (50), (53) and (B7). We know from (B8) that for 2 ( H ; L ); the total di¤erential of p L (E T C q ; ) with respect to is constant and may be negative: We thus have to verify that p L (E T C q ; H ) = p L (E H ; H ) < L. From (17) and (29) we see that:
The …rst inequality follows from @p =@ > 0 in (23). The second inequality follows from (B2).
B.2 Less than complete adoption
In this section we verify that < 1 in all scenarios. We know from Section 6 that time consistency implements the full-information social optimum. Thus we only need to check that < 1 in the full-information social optimum and with commitment.
From (27), is increasing in x: Thus we need to make sure that < 1 holds for the highest possible x; which from (B3) and (B1) implies:
From (27), (51), (55), (B2) and (B4), we know that:
From (B9) to (B11) we thus need to make sure that:
Inequality (B12) holds because:
The …rst inequality follows from (7) and (16). The second inequality follows from (6).
Since (B12) holds, (B13) also holds, because:
The inequality follows from applying (9) to:
